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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between board structure
(consisting of board size, board composition, CEO role duality and chairman composition), investment
account holders (IAHs) and social contribution and the bank performance in one of the fastest-growing
industries, Islamic banking.
Design/methodology/approach – A generalized least square (GLS) regression model was used to
investigate such relationship applying data from a sample of 40 Islamic banks operating in Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period of 2008 until 2011.
Findings – The results show that both size and composition of the board have a negative effect on
bank performance. On the other hand, the separation of CEO and chairman roles and the IAHs have no
effect, while the chairman independence has a positive impact. As for the control variables, bank size
positively influences bank performance whereas leverage has a negative effect. Zakah and gross
domestic product produce no significant effect on bank performance.
Research limitations/implications – Even though the model has explained the significant part of
the variation in performance, there are other factors considered as noise in the model which are
unexplained due to the lack of data. As such, other mechanisms of corporate governance (CG)
comprising attributes of the remuneration and nominating committees and ownership structure may be
used in future research. The sample size is also limited; thus, in future research, the sample size could be
increased by including Islamic banks operating in all Middle East countries.
Practical implications – The results suggest that to yield a better bank performance, Islamic banks
should enhance the effectiveness of CG through the board of directors (BODs), whereby any decisions
made by the BODs would lead to greater investors’ confidence in the market. The results suggest that
policymakers should impose new mechanisms that could impact the effectiveness and compliance of
BODs on the code of CG and guidelines of micro-finance, in general, and among Islamic banks, in
particular. The community also has the right to know up to what extent are the Islamic banks are in
compliance with Shariah principles and rules and the impact of their transactions on the society’s
welfare.
Originality/value – BODs’ failures are the primary reason for the recent financial collapses, and
Islamic banks are not spared from these events. Even though many studies have examined the influence
of BODs effectiveness on the performance of conventional banking industry over time, studies on the
Islamic financial institutions are quite scarce. In addition, the results obtained by the studies on
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conventional banks may not be applicable to Islamic banks. This is because the BODs of Islamic banks
discharge their responsibilities and duties along with the existence of the Shariah supervisory board (a
multi-layer structure), which is quite different from the CG structure in conventional banks that is
dependent on the BODs (a single-layer). Therefore, this research attempts to fill the gap in the literature
by addressing this issue in the Islamic banking industry by using a stakeholder theory based on Islamic
perspective which has not been used yet in previous studies.
Keywords Corporate governance, Islamic banking, Bank performance,
Board of directors’ attributes
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Corporate governance (CG) has become an important subject during the past two
decades (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) since the failure of Enron in 2001. In the same period,
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) have witnessed the collapse of Turkish Ihlas Finance
House. The most significant reasons behind these collapses are the collusion of the
board of directors (BODs), the audit failures and excessive risk taken by the
management (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006).
The framework of CG under IFIs is quite different from conventional banks, as the
BODs works side by side with the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) (which is a
multi-layer structure), in accordance with the Shariah principles and rules. In addition to
skills that members of the BODs have in the conventional banking industry, members of
an Islamic bank should have high ethical codes and professional competence in the
banking field and should have a sufficient knowledge in Shariah issues pertaining to
banking activities (Chapra, 2007). According to Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011), CG
theories attempt to treat the economic interests’ conflict among all stakeholders and
reduces agency costs by using internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.
The BODs is considered to be the most important effective mechanism in an internal
governance structure.
Due to the paucity of research in banking governance, such as board effectiveness,
which requires more specific and complex monitoring mechanisms (Rachdi and Ben
Ameur, 2011). Very little is known about this issue in the Middle East, particularly,
among Islamic banks of GCC countries. Furthermore, the recent financial collapses and
banking distress are primarily caused by board failures (Kirkpatrick, 2009), and the
GCC Islamic banks are not exempted from these crises.
Islamic banks clearly have different governance frameworks than conventional
counterparts, which aim to minimize the risks involved. According to Mollah et al.
(2014), Islamic banks have a Shariah supervisory board that works as a second layer of
independent governance mechanism control to prevent the board of director and other
top management from taking high-risk investment activities. On the other hand, due to
Shariah restrictions, the transparency levels and the financial and risk disclosures are
high in Islamic banks, which enable them to engage in less risky investments.
The GCC countries also have similar economical, political, social and cultural factors
that may camouflage the differences which exist among them (Al-Muharrami and
Matthews, 2009). They also have a growing, stable and efficient financial and banking
system (Al-Musali and Ismail, 2012). In the past five years, the CG in the GCC countries
have been making important developments, but have faced significant challenges






































particularly for banks, as they represent over 60 per cent of the financial structure of the
GCC region (Saidi, 2011). Both good CG and profitable banking sector will have a
positive effect on the banking system and in reducing financial shocks, and thus,
contributing to the stability of the national economy and vice versa.
One of the most critical components of the internal CG of a firm to monitor the
management is the BODs (Fama, 1980), which affects a bank’s performance. Pathan and
Skully (2010) confirm that the BODs within banks are more important than in other
industries. Board attributes can minimize both agency conflicts and agency costs
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), which in turn will lead to an improve corporate value. The
importance of CG, particularly BODs structure refers to how a company utilizes
the resources effectively to support its performance (Gregory and Simms, 1999). The
empirical findings on the relationship between the BODs’ effectiveness and bank
performance in previous studies were inconclusive. These results are due to econometric
problems consisting of the endogeneity issue, sample-selection bias and time. This
study attempts to overcome these issues. Furthermore, the evidence about bank
performance in the conventional banking industry may not be generalized in the context
of Islamic banks of GCC countries due to the difference in financial systems.
Consequently, motivated by the need to address the determinants of GCC’s Islamic
banks’ performance, this study aims to investigate the impact of BODs mechanisms
(board size, board composition, role duality and chairman independence), Investment
Account Holders (IAHs) and social contribution on the bank performance during the
period of 2008-2011. This study uses a stakeholder theory from an Islamic viewpoint as
the theoretical framework, which has not been used in any existing literature yet.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the Islamic finance in GCC countries. Section 3 presents the literature review. Section
4 describes the research method, and Section 5 highlights the findings. Section 6
presents the sensitivity analysis. The last section provides the summary and conclusion,
including limitations and possible avenues for future research.
2. Overview of the Islamic finance in GCC countries
Islamic finance is still in the infancy stage that has recently gain the attention of many
economists due to its rapid growth and its ability to provide a competitive markets. It is
generally recognized as tools for mobilizing and allocating funds internationally. The
financial industry was ranked at second place in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)
contribution among the GCC countries (Al-Obaidan, 2008). Their banks are well-
capitalized and profitable (Sturm et al., 2008). Islamic finance institutions in GCC region
have grown from two firms in 1975 (Kuwait Finance House and Dubai Islamic Bank)
into more than 400 firms in 2012. Each firm offers a wide variety of Islamic financial
products and services.
The GCC countries are at the center of the Islamic world and are expected to be the
heart of the fast growing Islamic finance industry comprising investment and retail
banking, Takaful (insurance), fund management and the issuance and trading of
Shariah-compliant securities (Sukuk). The GCC countries have seen a propagation of
financial centers, and Bahrain has become the main heart of Islamic banking. The GCC
states have a greater ratio of Shariah-compliant financial assets and their Islamic banks’
products are more innovative (Wilson, 2009). In addition to banking, the GCC countries






































Takaful. Wilson (2009) states that the importance of these developments in the GCC
countries has created a new form of Islamic capitalism.
The amount of Shariah-compliant assets is quite massive in the GCC countries, with
the assets total are worth over US$536.9 billion in 2009 and expanded to around
US$1,584.4 billion at the end of 2012. This means that the GCC states acquire about 34
per cent of the total assets (IFBS, 2013). According to World Islamic Banking
Competitiveness Report (2013-2014), in 2012, out of all the total assets owned by Islamic
banks around the world, 53 per cent of the assets were located in Saudi Arabia, 24 per
cent in Qatar and 17 per cent in the UAE. The total Islamic banking market share in GCC
countries has increased from 22 per cent in 2008 to 78 per cent in 2012.
3. Literature review
3.1 Corporate governance in Islamic banks
In the Islamic context, the effective framework of CG represents a cornerstone for
financial institutions to preserve the interests of all stakeholders. The stakeholders’
interest is not limited to achieving profits or maximizing wealth but also to embrace the
aspects of ethics, Shariah and principle of the Divine Unity of Allah. The literature in the
Islamic CG provides two main frameworks. The first model is based on the principle of
Shura, where the stakeholders participate in achieving the main objective, the Divine
Unity of Allah (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Hassan, 2012). The second model is
founded on the rights of all stakeholders, not just the shareholders’ interest (Chapra and
Ahmed, 2002; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004; Wajdi, 2006). These two models give a strong
justification of the structure of Islamic CG as a stakeholder-centered framework.
Furthermore, Nienhaus (2006) clarified that Islamic CG should be value-oriented and be
based on the principle of social justice with regards to all stakeholders.
According to Salin et al. (2012), the members of BODs should discharge their
responsibilities and duties by making their decisions based on three fundamental
principles, Tawheed, Shariah and ethics, to serve all stakeholders. They should have
sufficient education and knowledge in both Shariah and Islamic banking field. Only
then can the BODs perform their task effectively.
In the past decade, the extensive literature regarding the effect of BODs’ structure on
performance have been focusing on the conventional banking industry (Adusei, 2011;
Belkhir, 2009; Juras and Hinson, 2008; Rachdi and Ben Ameur, 2011) and the findings are
inconclusive. Although there are several empirical studies recently being published on
Islamic banks’ governance and performance, the literature on Islamic banking
governance mechanisms are still quite scarce. For example, Ghayad (2008) examined the
effect on the roles of both deposit holders and SSB on CG practices of Islamic banks in
Bahrain and the factors that determine their performance. The study suggested that in
order to encourage the bank’s management to introduce new services and products
in conformity with Shariah principles and rules, SSB must be widely knowledgeable in
the economic and financial field. To improve the practices of CG within Islamic banks,
the SSB is supposed to represent the IAHs in the BODs of the bank. The result shows
that the bank’s performance is not only influenced by internal quantitative factors such
as financial ratios but also by external factors which are qualitative in nature, for
example, managerial elements.
Al-Tamimi (2012) studied, in the first part of his research, the relationship between






































stakeholders and shareholders, as well as policies and compliance with the bank’s CG. In
the second part of his research, he examined the influence of CG of the UAE national
banks on performance and financial distress. The findings show that the UAE banks are
more conscious of the importance of CG factors. He also finds that the practices of CG
among UAE banks are at satisfactory level. The results reveal a positive significant
association between disclosure and transparency, interests of shareholders and
stakeholders and the BODs’ role with the practices of CG of the UAE banks. Moreover,
the results show that CG practices are positively and insignificantly correlated with the
level of performance, but have a positive significant impact on financial distress.
However, he finds no significant difference in the level of CG practices between Islamic
banks and its counterparts.
Matoossi and Grassa (2014) examine the effect of CG mechanisms on the performance
of 77 biggest Islamic banks and 85 conventional banks in both GCC countries and
Southeast Asia countries from 2000 to 2009. They discovered several important
differences between CG variables of the two types of banks. Furthermore, they noticed
that the board fee, CEO duality and CEO age have a positive significant influence on the
performance of Islamic banks. They also stressed the important role played by the SSB
in creating the Islamic banks’ value and performance.
In summary, none of the previous studies on CG of IFIs has examined the effect of
BODs’ characteristics on Islamic banks’ performance except that of Matoossi and
Grassa (2014). The BODs’ structure seemed to be a significant mechanism that could
affect the performance firmly and is considered as an important factor of CG (Bhagat
and Bolton, 2008). The BODs may lead to higher monitoring and, as a result, may
maximize company value and the extent to which the board will influence the
performance may also depend on the attributes of this CG indicator. Thus, this study
examines the impact of the board structure (board size, board composition and
separation role between CEO and chairman) as well as IAHs and social contribution on
Islamic banks’ performance.
3.2 Hypotheses development
3.2.1 Board size and bank performance. Board size is considered one of the main
important mechanisms of CG, and therefore is affected company performance (Zahra
and Pearce, 1989). According to a stakeholder theory, an increase in the number of BODs
will improve the degree of stakeholders’ representation, and no individual or small
group of people would dominate decision made by the board (Ghayad, 2008).
However, empirical studies have documented several mixed results. While Juras and
Hinson (2008) found that the board size has no impact on performance, Adusei (2011),
Al-Saidi and Al-Sammari (2013), Belkhir (2009) and Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) found
that a smaller board size can improve the company’s performance.
From an Islamic viewpoint, a reasonable size of the board members is preferable
because their experience and knowledge related to Shariah and banking issues could
mitigate communication problems and, consequently, would improve performance. In
the Islamic banking context, the minimum members of the BODs in the UAE should not
be less than 3 and not more than 15. The board size should not be lower than 5 and 3 in
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, respectively, and not exceed 11 members for both countries.
The regulations of Bahrain do not identify the minimum of board size, but it should not






































maximum number of the BODs for banks; however, but it should not be less than 3
directors (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013). Hence, the following hypothesis is
developed:
H1. A higher (lower) number of board members will have greater (lesser) influence
on performance.
3.2.2 Board composition and bank performance. According to stakeholder perspective
based on Shariah principles, in Shura principle, the BODs of Islamic banks should
represent all stakeholders or the majority of them or those who have no stakes in the
banks (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). The non-executive directors (NEDs) play a significant
function as representatives and protectors of the interest of all stakeholders unlimited to
only shareholders (Chilosi and Damiani, 2007). More importantly, the main role of NEDs
is to uphold social justice and welfare, and religious matters rather than maximizing
shareholders’ wealth (Ben-Amar and Zeghal, 2011; Nienhaus, 2006).
In the context of Islam, the directors, particularly, non-executives should have a high
reputation of ethical integrity and must possess a high qualification in Islamic finance
and economy to understand and solve modern issues pertaining to the banking
industry, which in turn may lead to improve the overall performance.
Previous results on the relationship between the board composition and bank
performance have been mixed. While, Juras and Hinson (2008) found a positive impact
on performance, Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) in contrast, found a negative effect.
However, Belkhir (2009) and Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) did not find any relationship
at all. Based on the empirical results and both stakeholder and Islamic perspectives, the
following hypothesis was developed:
H2. Board composition has a positive effect on bank performance.
3.2.3 The separation of CEO and chairman role. Another aspect to inspect in the
independence of the board is the “dominant personality” phenomena (Chapra and
Ahmed, 2002). According to Belkhir (2009), the role duality would cause a decrease in the
agency’s cost and would improve its performance. This is because CEO duality leaves
the authority within a firm in the hand of a single person only. This allows the CEO to
manage the BODs effectively to achieve the company’s goals (Belkhir, 2009).
Chapra and Ahmed (2002) recommends IFIs to separate the two roles of chairman
and CEO because it will provide the necessary checks and balances of power and
authority on management behavior and will, in return, protect the interest of all
stakeholders. The chairman and the CEO should have excellent personal attributes such
as honesty, frugality and readiness, which are mentioned in the Quran and the Sunnah
to execute their role effectively (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002).
There are evidence that proves that role duality can improve corporate performance
(Pi and Timme, 1993). However, recent studies have found no significant relationship
between role duality and performance (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and
Hudaib, 2006). Based on the above arguments, the following hypothesis is developed:
H3. The separation of CEO and chairman functions has a positive effect on bank
performance.
3.2.4 Chairman independence. The chairman’s independence from the executive






































oversight and monitoring function of the board by supervising and controlling the
CEO function (Abbott et al., 2004; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002),
and consequently, improve the firm’s performance. In addition, a non-executive
chairman may also influence the company’s prospective success (Daily and Dalton,
1993).
In contrast to the conventional perspective, a Muslim leader (such as the
chairman) should have the following important attributes; allegiance to Allah,
pursuing for general Islamic goals in addition to stakeholders’ interests, adherence
to Shariah and Islamic ethics, truthfulness and honesty (Ather and Sobhani, 2008).
The Islamic view for this type of leadership is supported by the stakeholder theory
which states that the chairman should have the moral obligations to lead and
maintain the cooperation and coordination amongst the BODs. This, in return, can
be used as a catalyst to preserve the interest of all the stakeholders, and to achieve
social justice and welfare within the community. Thus, the following hypothesis is
developed:
H4. Chairman independence has a positive relationship with banks’ performance.
3.2.5 Investment account holders. Ownership structure is another important
determinant that can influence a company performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
The aggregate investment portfolio of an Islamic bank includes shareholders’ equity
and funds from IAHs as well as other sources available to the bank (Archer et al., 1998).
A number of studies have reviewed the influence of ownership structure on Islamic
banks’ performance (Abbas et al., 2009; Zouari and Taktak, 2012). However, none of
these studies has used IAHs as a mechanism of ownership structure. This study uses the
same measurement that has been used by Farook et al. (2011). Thus, the following
hypothesis is developed:
H5. There is a positive relationship between the proportion of IAHs fund and
Islamic banks’ performance.
3.2.6 Social contribution. Social contribution is considered as an important element that
differentiates Islamic banks from conventional banks and as such, Zakah reporting is
needed to achieve the Islamic accounting objectives (Bayoun and Willet, 2000). Islamic
banks are required to prepare the statement of sources and the uses of Zakah fund that
includes the balance of undistributed Zakah and the reasons for its undistributed
amount (Maali et al., 2006). The evaluation of Islamic banks’ performance should be
based on the periodic Zakah payment (Hameed et al., 2011). Zakah main contribution is
to improve the quality of people’s life, and eliminate, or at least alleviate, poverty within
the society. It is expected that Islamic banks which have a good track record of Zakah
payment would have a better performance:
H6. There is a positive relationship between social contribution and Islamic banks’
performance.
4. Research method
4.1 Data and sample size
The sample of Islamic banks was selected from a list of IFIs on the Web site of
AAOIFI (http://aaoifi.com) and AIBIM (http://aibim.com). Only full data of 40






































association between BODs’ structure and IAHs with bank performance from 2008 to
2011. These years were selected because they were the most recent samples when
this study was started. The sample includes 21 banks from Bahrain, 8 banks from
Kuwait, three banks from Qatar, four banks from Saudi Arabia and four banks from
UAE. This generates 160 bank-year observations based on a balanced panel data.
This study defines full-fledged Islamic banks as any bank offering banking services
and investment or those firms that conducts Modaraba and leasing transactions
based on Shariah principles and rules.
4.2 Variable measurement
The data related to performance measures, BODs’ attributes and control variables
during the years 2008-2011 were collected from the bank’s annual reports. However,
only the GDP variable was obtained from the World Bank Web site (www.worldbank.
org).
The two accounting measures for performance was used as the dependent
variable, namely, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The two ratios
of ROE and ROA are considered as the best tools for measuring a bank’s
performance (Sinkey, 2002). These two ratios were widely used in previous studies
conducted (Siddiqui, 2008; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009).
4.3 Control variables
In addition, three further variables were used to control other possible effects of bank
performance at both the company and country level. The first control variable is bank
size (Adusei, 2011; Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Large
Islamic banks can invest financial resources in different profit-sharing instruments to
diversify their risks based on Shariah principles and rules, and thus they offer their
products and services at a lower cost and higher profit. Leverage is the second variable
that is usually used in studies of CG (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and
Hudaib, 2006). Islamic banks with a wealthy capital tend to use internal resources to
finance their investments before using outside funds. Islamic banks with more assets
and low debt would improve their investments, and thus their performance (Bukair,
2013). Finally, GDP per capita is used as a country-level variable to control any
differences between GCC countries. This variable is commonly used in CG studies
(Cosset et al., 2012; Renders et al., 2010). Generally, GDP has a positive effect on financial
sector activities. People with a higher income in GCC tends to save more money,
resulting in an increase funds of Islamic banks that lead to more investments, and thus,
better performance. Table I displays the definition of the dependent, independent and
control variables.
4.4 Specification of the model
This study uses panel data that give proper information on multiple statistical cases for
a span of several years. This technique has a number of benefits over cross-sectional or
time-series data in economic research in terms of increasing the levels of freedom and
minimizing collinearity, which will improve the econometric estimates’ efficiency (Shah
and Khan, 2007). Both fixed- and random-effect techniques were tested in the regression
analysis. This study uses regression analysis of generalized least square (GLS) for both
performance measures (ROA and ROE) to examine the relationship between the bank






































of GLS provides a remedy for any bias of omitted variable emerging from heterogeneity,
which refers to unobserved variables and time-invariant. It also provides a remedy for
the endogenetic time-invariant sources. The model to test the hypotheses of the study is
shown below:
PERMit  0  1BS  2BC  3CEO  4CHAIR  5IAHs
 6ZAK  7LTA  8LEV  9GDP  it
where:
PERM  performance (using ROA and ROE);
I  cross-sectional unit;
T  time series;
0  intercept (has constant value);
1 to 9  the coefficients’ scope;
BS  board size;
BC  board composition;
CEO  the separation of CEO and chairman role;
CHAIR  chairman independence;
IAHs  investment account holders;
ZAK  Zakah;
LTA  bank size;
LEV  leverage ratio;
GDP  gross domestic product per capita; and








Return on assets (ROA) Net income before tax and Zakah/total assets
Return on equity (ROE) Net income before tax and Zakah/total equity
Independent variable
BODs characteristics
Board size (BS) The total number of directors on the board
Board composition (BC) The percentage of non-executive directors to total
number of directors on the board
The separation of CEO and chairman
role (CEO)
Dummy variable; 1 if the CEO is a different
person from the chairman, 0 otherwise
Chairman independence (CHAIR) Dummy variable; 1 if the chairman is a non-
executive director, 0 otherwise
Investment account holders (IAHs) Proportion of total of investment account funds
to shareholders equity
Social contribution (ZAK) The total amount of Zakah over total assets
Control variable
Bank size (LTA) The natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage (LEV) Total liabilities without profit sharing investment
accounts (PSIA) over total assets








































This study uses parametric and non-parametric tests. Table II demonstrates the
statistics of performance measures and six explanatory and three control variables.
Regarding the dependent variable, the table shows that the mean for the ROA and
ROE was 0.0232 and 0.0365, respectively, and these mean values are more accurate
comparing to the 0.30 and 0.072 that were documented by Bukair (2013). The
negative result may due to the effects of the 2007 global financial crisis.
The BS had a mean value of 8.8, showing that the board size of Islamic banks in GCC
countries consists of nearly nine executive-directors. This is in line with the best practice
of CG for IFIs (Hawkamah, 2011), who recommended that the ideal board size should not
be less than seven person. The amount of the directors on the board are quite similar to
8.28, as reported in a study by Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) for Kuwaiti banks. BC
had a mean value of 91.23 per cent, indicating that more than 90 per cent of directors
were NEDs, and this ratio is consistent with the best practice of CG for IFIs (Hawkamah,
2011). Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) found that 94 per cent of members in Kuwaiti
banks were NEDs. The mean for the separation of CEO and chairman role is about 97 per
cent, indicating that the vast majority of Islamic banks have two different persons for
both functions, and this is in conformity with the best practice of CG for IFIs
(Hawkamah, 2011). This percentage is higher than 49 per cent found by Al-Saidi and
Al-Shammari (2013) in Kuwaiti banks. This implies that a separate leadership structure
is more common in Islamic banks than in conventional ones. CHAIR had a mean value
of 87.5 per cent, indicating that most banks have a non-executive chairman and is in line
with the best practice of CG for IFIs (Hawkamah, 2011). This is higher than 24 and 53 per
cent that were found by Saat et al. (2011) and Habbash et al. (2010) for Malaysian and
British companies, respectively. The mean value of IAHs is about 32.70 per cent. This
implies that Islamic banks of GCC depended more on the investment account equity in
funding their operations than shareholders’ equity, and reflects the extent of investors’
confidence in Islamic banks. The value of social contribution (ZAK) is 79 per cent,







Variables Observations Mean Minimum Maximum SD
ROA 160 0.0232 0.5901 0.2178 0.1160
ROE 160 0.0365 3.0047 0.3602 0.3537
BS 160 8.8063 4.00 14.0 2.0078
BC 160 0.9123 0.625 1.00 0.07487
CEO 160 0.9688 0.00 1.00 0.17454
CHAIR 160 0.875 0.00 1.00 0.33176
IAHs 160 32.6996 0.0183 4,716.79 372.6564
ZAK 160 0.007914 0.0000429 0.0302346 0.00781638
LTA in million $ 160 6,254.479 12.086 58,900 10,700
LEV 160 0.4515 0.00028 0.911 0.31532
GDP 160 0.0046 0.2171 0.44479 0.166229






































As for the control variables, the mean of total assets is about $6,255 million, and 45 per
cent for LEV, which are lower than $7,160 million and 47 per cent in Bukair’s (2013)
study, respectively. Lastly, the GDP per capita had a mean of 0.0046, indicating a
reduction in the country economic development level due to the effects of global
financial crisis that started in 2007.
Table III demonstrates the correlation between the dependent, explanatory and
control variables. Multicollinearity is considered a serious problem when the correlation
between the independent variables exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 2004). The highest correlation
between bank size (LTA) and leverage (LEV) is 0.5095. The table indicates that Islamic
banks with smaller board size, high funds from IAHs and having a non-executive
chairman, have a higher performance. Table III also shows that the lower the social
contribution (ZAK), LEV ratio and GDP growth, the higher the Islamic banks’
performance.
5.2 GLS model findings
Table IV shows that the GLS models for both performance measures (ROA and ROE)
are significant at the less than 1 per cent level. The R2 for ROA and ROE are 0.2717 and
0.3153, respectively, indicating that 27 and 31 per cent variance in both measures of
performance is interpreted by six explanatory and three control variables.
BS has a negative effect on performance, and is significant with ROE, but not with
ROA. Thus, H1 is rejected. The negative sign indicates that the directors in Islamic
banks’ boards are not selected based on their expertise and experience, but more often
for fulfilling the requirements of CG codes in GCC region. This result is in line with the
study by Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) for Tunisian banks. The results of both
measures implies that a smaller board makes quicker decisions and play an effective
role in monitoring performance and creating value for GCC Islamic banks.
The ratio of NEDs on the board (BC) has a significant negative effect on performance,
and therefore H2 is rejected. However, this finding is consistent with previous studies by
Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013). The findings contradict the stakeholder theory from
an Islamic perspective that the presence of NEDs improves bank performance. This is
due to the lack of banking and Shariah knowldege of the NEDs, which reduces the
monitoring efficiency and resulting in poor performance. The results indicate that a
larger number of NEDs on the board is not effective in controlling mangers or in
curtailing shareholders’ power for appointing NEDs in Islamic banks.
The separation of CEO and chairman roles is negatively insignificant with the
performance. Thus, H3 is rejected. This finding is compatible with Al-Saidi and
Al-Shammari’s (2013) study for Kuwaiti banks. However, the results are inconsistent
with stakeholder and Islamic perspectives, which states that the two roles should not be
held by the same person, as set in the best practice of CG and regulations for IFIs (Chapra
and Ahmed, 2002; Hawkamah, 2011). These results are supported by a research
conducted by Abdul Rahman and Haniffa (2002), who found that role duality leads to a
weaker board potency and results in poor performance. The results imply that the
chairman of the BODs in GCC Islamic banks has strong voice in choosing and in
appointing the CEO. Another explanation is, role duality enhances decision-making by
focusing more on the bank strategic goals, and allows the CEO to form the fate of the







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A non-executive chairman has a positive and significant effect on ROE, but insignificant
effect on the ROA. Thus, H4 is confirmed for ROE, but is rejected for ROA. This outcome
is in line with the Islamic and stakeholder perspectives who suggested that the
non-executive chairman can enhance CG-quality by improving BODs monitoring to
control the CEO function to serve the interest of all stakeholders and to achieve social
justice and welfare objectives within the society.
However, the BODs does not seem to be an important indicator for measuring the
performance of Islamic banks. This finding contradicts the fundamental debates of this
paper which states that the BODs of Islamic banks enhances the management in
improving the performance. This could be the result of a weak monitoring ability or an
ineffective supervisory board in Islamic banks because the person who appoints NEDs
on the boards is the shareholders.
The insignificance of IAHs implies that Islamic banks improve their performance in
order to maximize shareholders wealth rather than other investors, which is contrary to
stakeholder and Islamic perspectives. This result suggests that Islamic banks’
managers should act to preserve the interest of all stakeholders, not only shareholders.
Table IV also shows that Zakah (ZAK) has no effect on performance. This implies
that the social contribution of Islamic banks does not affect their performance. This
result is in contrast to the expectation that the Zakah paid would improve bank
performance according to the Quran and the Sunnah.
Regarding control variables, bank size (LTA) has a highly significant positive
association with performance, which confirm the results of Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari
(2013). The finding indicates that large Islamic banks have lower costs of information
collection, more resources and lower risks in financial markets resulting in better
performance. The results suggest that, due to stiff competition, smaller Islamic banks
need to maximize their efficiency and productivity to remain profitable, and more
importantly, to survive. Furthermore, leverage (LEV) has a highly significant negative
effect on performance, and the findings are consistent with previous studies (Al-Saidi
and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This result suggested that Islamic
banks prefer to utilize their internal sources to finance their investments rather than
obtaining outside funds. Their business transactions are expected to reduce risks due to
different profit-sharing instruments used. Interestingly, GDP has an insignificant
negative effect on performance. This is consistent with Zeitun (2012) in the case of
Islamic banks. The findings can be attributed to the financial crisis that started in 2007,
which reduced the GDP growth of GCC countries, and indirectly affecting banks’
activities and their performance.
6. Sensitivity analysis
The findings of sensitivity analysis are shown in Table IV (columns 2 and 4). These
columns demonstrate the findings of the primary model after excluding the year of
financial crisis (2008). The findings of these models are almost similar to the main model
and therefore are not reported here.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this study is to analyze the influence of board attributes, IAHs and social






































during a period of 2008-2012 by utilizing the stakeholder framework. The GLS model is
used to test such relationship.
The findings show that Islamic banks’ performance is not derived by the corporate
mechanism of the BODs, ownership structure and social contribution. The findings fail
to reject the hypotheses that the BODs, IAHs and Zakah improve Islamic banks’
performance. Boards dominated by NEDs have zero effect on bank performance as they
have insufficient Shariah and banking knowledge due to the fact that they are appointed
by shareholders. A non-executive chairman has the ability to diligently practice its
expected function in protecting the interest of all stakeholders, and has the authority to
realize economic and social objectives that are in conformity with Shariah principles
and rules. Furthermore, the NEDs tend to not fulfill any supervisory functions, limiting
their role to only establish general Islamic banks’ strategies and policies. Moreover, the
results have proven that the management seems to preserve only the interest of
shareholders rather than other investors such as IAHs.
The findings of this paper are considered to be a valuable source of knowledge for
policymakers and regulators in several ways. First, it may help GCC Islamic banking
regulators in creating strategies towards improving the performance and yield a better
value creation. Furthermore, GCC Islamic banking policymakers should assess the
proper board size in consideration each individual bank. Finally, Islamic banking
policymakers of GCC countries should revise the CG requirements on the selection of
NEDs and impose limits on appointing the board in order to strengthen its structure and
composition to develop the board processes and decisions making which will give rise to
a better performance.
This study has its own limitations that can provide opportunities for future research.
First, although the model has explored a significant part of the variation in bank
performance, the major factors in the model are unexplained due to the limitations the
data available. As such, future research may use other mechanisms of CG, including the
remuneration and nominating committees, the top five largest shareholders and
managerial shareholdings. These features have been found to be influential
theoretically and empirically in CG studies under the conventional banking. Probably,
some of these factors may be applicable to Islamic banks. Next, there is a need to study
the impact of CG changes on Islamic banks’ performance in the short-, mid- and
long-term. Finally, the sample is limited to Islamic banks in GCC countries. Thus, future
research may extend the sample to all Middle East countries or by conducting
comparative study between Islamic banks operating in Islamic countries and Western
countries.
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